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eliminate the temptation of the requesting party to alter his or her
testimony to conform to the film,a" and the uncertainty concerning
the contents of the films will ensure truthfulness.38 From the plain-
tiff's perspective, he or she is benefitted by having the time to test
the films prior to trial and thus protect against manipulative film-
making, or similar chicanery.9
Richard W. Viola
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(7): New York Court of Appeals broad-
ens scope of rule to include attorney criticism of the judiciary
New York's Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code")'
has been viewed by the courts as the guidepost in determining the
bounds of lawyers' professional conduct.2 The Code's disciplinary
3 Id. at 612.
'8 See Snead v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, 59 F.R.D. 148, 150 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
I d.
See N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (McKinney 1990) [hereinafter
CODE]. "The Code... points the way [for] the aspiring [attorneys] and provides standards
by which to judge the transgressor." Id. pmbl. at 354-55; see also N.Y.S.B.A. THE LAWYER'S
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. at 1 (1990) [hereinafter LAWYER'S CODE]. The
Code was first promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1969 and adopted by the
New York State Bar Association in 1970 as its official code of ethics. See N.Y. JUD. LAW
app. at 351 (McKinney 1975). In 1983, the American Bar Association drafted rules of profes-
sional conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. Although the Model Rules were never adopted by the New York Bar, they did serve
as the basis for major revisions in the 1970 Code. See LAWYER'S CODE, supra, letter insert
from the President of the New York State Bar Ass'n, dated September, 1990. These revi-
sions were ultimately adopted by the four judicial departments of the Appellate Division of
State Supreme Court, and promulgated as joint rules of the appellate divisions effective
September 1, 1990. See N.Y. JUD. LAW app. at 108 (McKinney Supp. 1992). The disciplinary
committees of the appellate divisions are responsible for the supervision of attorney conduct
and the establishment of standards by which to review such conduct. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2)
(McKinney 1983); see also Grunberg v. Feller, 132 Misc. 2d 738, 741, 505 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1986) (disciplinary committees of appellate divisions are
proper forums for complaints involving attorney misconduct).
2 See In re Hof, 102 A.D.2d 591, 596, 478 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (2d Dep't 1984) ("The disci-
plinary rules and ethical considerations set down in the Code of Professional Responsibility
... represent the acknowledged standards of the profession . . . ."). The Code consists of
Canons, which represent general principles of professional conduct expected of attorneys,
Ethical Considerations, which are aspirational and outline the objectives of the profession
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rules set forth the "minimum level of conduct below which no law-
yer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."'3 Discipli-
nary Rule ("DR") 1-102(A)(7) (formerly DR 1-102(A)(6)),4 pro-
vides that a lawyer shall not engage in any "conduct that adversely
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law."' Courts have em-
ployed this language to reprimand attorneys for, inter alia, conver-
sion and commingling a client's funds,' forging a client's name,7
and Disciplinary Rules, which are mandatory rules binding on all New York attorneys. See
LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 1, at 2.
' See CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary Statement at 355-56. The vast number of possi-
ble situations involving misconduct led the drafters of the Code to provide that attorney
discipline may rest on the general principles espoused in the Disciplinary Rules. Id.; see also
In re Lewis, 159 A.D.2d 854, 860, 553 N.Y.S.2d 861, 863 (3d Dep't) (attorney disbarred for
converting client funds), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 783, 559 N.E.2d 674, 559 N.Y.S.2d 980
(1990); In re Harris, 139 A.D.2d 253, 256, 531 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (1st Dep't 1988) (attorney
received two-year suspension based on violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 1-102(A)(5), and
DR 1-102(A)(6)); In re Weichert, 40 A.D.2d 261, 263, 339 N.Y.S.2d 750, 753-54 (4th Dep't)
(violation of escrow agreement basis for disbarment under DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 7-
102(A)(3)), appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 514, 301 N.E.2d 869, 348 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1973); People
v. Doe, 98 Misc. 2d 805, 809, 414 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621 (Nassau County Ct. 1979) (discussing
disciplinary rules regarding attorney's representation of multiple clients).
The drafters made no attempt to prescribe the penalties for every potential violation of
the rules, but noted that the Canons and Ethical Considerations could provide interpretive
guidance. See CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary Statement at 356. For example, in In re
Cohen, 139 A.D.2d 221, 224, 530 N.Y.S.2d 830, 832 (1st Dep't 1988), the court refused to
declare DR 1-102(A)(6)[now (7)] unconstitutionally vague, stating that "[DR 1-102(A)(6)]
does not exist in a vacuum. [Rather,] [it must be read in conjunction with the other [rules]
and the ethical strictures of the Code .... " Id.
Courts have recognized that although the Code and its provisions are not given statu-
tory status, they represent the traditional and acknowledged standards of the legal profes-
sion and thus should be complied with and enforced. See In re Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d 1, 6,
351 N.E.2d 647, 649, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1976); Hof, 102 A.D.2d at 596, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 42;
Grunberg, 132 Misc. 2d at 741, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
Disciplinary sanctions include disbarment, suspension, reprimand, and censure, and
have been deemed necessary to protect the public, to deter unfavorable, repetitive conduct,
and to uphold the integrity of the Bar and Bench. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2) (McKinney
1983); In re Kasdan, 164 A.D.2d 90, 92, 561 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (1st Dep't 1990) (purpose of
disciplinary proceeding is to protect public); In re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455, 460, 480
N.Y.S.2d 603, 607 (3d Dep't 1984) (proceeding aimed at protecting public, deterring similar
conduct and preserving reputation of Bar); In re Rotwein, 20 A.D.2d 428, 429, 247 N.Y.S.2d
775, 777 (lst Dep't 1964) (purpose of disciplinary proceeding to protect public from "minis-
trations of the unfit").
' In 1990, the Code of Professional Responsibility was amended, and DR 1-102(A)(6)
became DR 1-102(A)(7).
5 See CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(7).
See In re Grubart, 164 A.D.2d 144, 146, 561 N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (1st Dep't 1990), ap-
peal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 803, 569 N.E.2d 874, 568 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1991); In re Hardy, 172
A.D.2d 866, 866-69, 568 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464-65 (3d Dep't 1991); In re Altschuler, 139 A.D.2d
311, 313, 531 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1st Dep't 1988).
' See In re Young, 168 A.D.2d 26, 27, 572 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (4th Dep't 1991).
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engaging in conduct aimed at benefiting the attorney's personal in-
terests," neglecting legal matters,9 testifying falsely,10 pleading
guilty to criminal charges," and engaging in activity that gives an
appearance of impropriety. 2 Recently, in In re Holtzman,"3 the
New York Court of Appeals broadened the scope of DR 1-
102(A)(7) by disciplining an attorney for publicly disclosing false
and unsubstantiated allegations against a judge.14
The petitioner in Holtzman, former District Attorney Eliza-
beth Holtzman, disseminated a letter to the press accusing Judge
Irving Levine of having engaged in acts of professional impropriety
during a criminal trial involving charges of sexual misconduct. 5
Holtzman contended that the judge asked the victim to reenact, on
the floor of his robing room and in front of other witnesses, the
position she was in when the alleged sexual assault took place."
" See In re Wolfe, 146 A.D.2d 234, 235, 542 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (4th Dep't 1989) (attor-
ney disbarred for agreeing to pay former mayor in return for city-sponsored work); In re
Resseguie, 138 A.D.2d 887, 890, 526 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (3d Dep't 1988) (attorney advice to
client affected by own financial interests); In re Oliver, 142 A.D.2d 831, 834, 530 N.Y.S.2d
890, 892 (3d Dep't 1988) (attorney counselled elderly client to invest in speculative invest-
ments in which attorney had financial stake).
See In re Johnson, 168 A.D.2d 193, 194, 572 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (4th Dep't 1991) (at-
torney failed to perform agreed legal services); In re Pollack, 142 A.D.2d 386, 388, 536
N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (1st Dep't 1989) (failure to wind up estate diligently constituted neglect);
In re Anderson, 137 A.D.2d 233, 235-36, 528 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743-44 (4th Dep't 1988) (lawyer
failed to carry out client instructions).
1o See In re Harris, 139 A.D.2d 253, 256, 531 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (1st Dep't 1988) (attor-
ney testified falsely regarding receipt of subpoena).
" See In re Williams, 105 A.D.2d 974, 975, 481 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (3d Dep't 1984)
(guilty plea to unlawful conduct adversely affects ability to practice); In re Higgins, 105
A.D.2d 462, 463, 480 N.Y.S.2d 257, 257-58 (3d Dep't 1984) (conviction for possession of
marihuana reflects poorly on profession).
12 See Oliver, 142 A.D.2d at 834, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (attorney's conduct gave clear
appearance of impropriety and violated DR 1-102(A)(6) [now (7)]); In re Wehringer, 135
A.D.2d 279, 282, 525 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (1st Dep't) (multiple violations reflected adversely
on attorney's fitness to practice), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 988 (1988); In re Sherbunt, 134
A.D.2d 723, 725, 520 N.Y.S.2d 885, 888 (3d Dep't 1987) (circumstances surrounding loan
and gift by elderly client to attorney gave appearance of impropriety).
-3 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991).
14 Id. at 191-92, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
15 Id. at 188, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 40. The letter originally was addressed
to the Committee to Implement Recommendations of the New York State Task Force on
Women in the Courts, but subsequently was disseminated to the public by the petitioner in
conjunction with a "news alert." Id. at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 31-32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 40-41.
,6 Id. at 188-89, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 40. The letter described the incident
as follows:
Judge Levine asked the Assistant District Attorney, defense counsel, defendant,
court officer and court reporter to join him in the robing room, where the judge
then asked the victim to get down on the floor and show the position she was in
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:533
Unwilling to delay the public release of her statement until the
trial minutes had been procured, 7 Holtzman based her allegations
solely on a description of the incident in an interoffice memoran-
dum prepared by a newly admitted trial assistant.'8 Following the
disclosure, an administrative judge of the New York City Criminal
Court conducted an investigation regarding the truth of Holtz-
man's charges and concluded that her claim of judicial misconduct
lacked evidentiary support.19 The matter was thereafter submitted
to the Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District to de-
termine whether Holtzman's actions constituted a violation of the
Code.20 A Letter of Admonition was issued 21 following the Griev-
ance Committee's finding that the petitioner violated DR 8-
102(B),22 DR 1-102(A)(5) 2" and DR 1-102(A)(6)[now (7)],24 as well
as Ethical Consideration ("EC") 8-6 of the Code. 5
In response to the Admonition, the petitioner requested and
was granted a subcommittee hearing.26 The subcommittee formally
charged Holtzman with misconduct pursuant to DR 8-102(B), DR
1-102(A)(5), and DR 1-102(A)(6)[now (7)]." After the hearing, the
subcommittee determined that the petitioner's disclosure to the
when she was being sexually assaulted .... [Tihe victim reluctantly got down on
her hands and knees as everyone stood and watched. In making the victim assume
the position she was forced to take when she was sexually assaulted, Judge Levine
profoundly degraded, humiliated and demeaned her.
Id. (alterations in original).
" Id. at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42. Holtzman issued the news releases,
ignoring her staff's concerns regarding the ethical implications of publicly disclosing such
accusations without the trial minutes. Id.
" Id.
Id. at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41. Administrative Judge Robert Keat-
ing directed the investigation and submitted it to then Chief Administrative Judge Albert
M. Rosenblatt. Id.
20 Id.
2 Id. A Letter of Admonition represents the committee's conclusion that professional
misconduct occurred. See [1985] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 691.6(a).
22 See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41; see also
CODE, supra note 1, DR 8-102(B). The latter rule provides that "[a] lawyer shall not know-
ingly make false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer." Id.
22 See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41; see also
CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(5) ("A lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.").
2 See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
2" See id. at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41; see also CODE, supra note 1, EC
8-6 (discussing lawyer's duty to "protest earnestly against the appointment or election of
those who are unsuited for the bench").
26 See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
27 Id.
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media prior to obtaining the trial minutes, coupled with her failure
to speak to other witnesses allegedly present during the incident,
demonstrated her unfitness to practice law. 28 Pursuant to the sub-
committee's findings, the full Grievance Committee issued a Letter
of Reprimand, 9 concluding that the petitioner's conduct was both
"prejudicial to the administration of justice and adversely re-
flect[ed] on [her] fitness to practice law," thereby violating DR 1-
102(A)(5) and DR 1-102(A)(6)[now (7)] of the Code.30
The petitioner commenced judicial proceedings in the Appel-
late Division, Second Department, seeking to vacate the Letter of
Reprimand.31 The appellate division rejected the petitioner's
claim, concluding that the record sustained the committee's find-
ings that the petitioner violated DR 8-102(B) and DR 1-
102(A) (6) [now (7)].32 Thereafter, the petitioner appealed, asserting
that (1) her conduct did not violate a specific disciplinary rule, (2)
DR 1-102(A)(6)[now (7)] is impermissibly vague, and (3) her alle-
gations should be afforded First Amendment protection.3
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate divi-
sion's decision in a per curiam opinion. 4 The court, however, ex-
pressly limited its ruling to the petitioner's violation of DR 1-
102(A)(6)[now (7)]. 3" Addressing petitioner's first assertion, the
Holtzman court stated that the Code warrants somewhat broad
" Id. at 189-90, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41. The subcommittee served the
petitioner with three formal charges of misconduct. Id. The first charge alleged the peti-
tioner's unfitness to practice law by focusing on the petitioner's public disclosure "(1) prior
to obtaining the minutes of the criminal trial, (2) without... speak[ing] with ... person[s]
present during the alleged misconduct, (3) without meeting with or discussing the incident
with the trial assistant who reported it, and (4) with the knowledge that Judge Levine was
being transferred ... and [that] the matter would be investigated . .. ." Id. The second
charge concerned the petitioner's subsequent videotaping of the complaining witness' state-
ment and its release to the media. Id. at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41. The
third charge involved a subsequent press release in which Holtzman stated that she knew of
other accusations of misconduct by Judge Levine. Id.
29 Id. at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41. The subcommittee makes factual
findings and reports them to the full committee. See [1987] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 691.4(h). A
letter of reprimand may be issued after a full committee hearing. See [1985] 22 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 691.6(a).
11 Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41. No reference was
made to DR 8-102(B). Id.
31 Id.
2 Id. The appellate division ratified the committee's findings of fact, and agreed that
such findings constituted violations of DR 8-102(B) and DR 1-102(A)(6). Id.
11 Id. at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32-33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42.
3, Id. at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
35 Id.
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language because of the virtual impossibility of defining every con-
ceivable professional abuse.36 In addition, the court refused to de-
clare the rule unconstitutionally vague, stating that to do so would
undermine the Code's effectiveness as an ethical guideline for the
legal community. 37 To render the broad language meaningful, the
court held that a "reasonable attorney" standard must be applied
to determine the appropriateness of a lawyer's professional con-
duct. 8 The court stated that "the guiding principle must be
whether a reasonable attorney, familiar with the Code and its ethi-
cal strictures would have notice of what conduct is proscribed. '39
In applying this standard, the Holtzman court determined that the
petitioner had notice that her public disclosure of specific false and
unsupported accusations would diminish public confidence in the
judicial system and reflect poorly on her fitness to practice law
which makes her actions a violation of DR 1-102(A)(6)[now (7)].4 o
Finally, the Holtzman court declined to extend First Amend-
ment protection to disciplinary proceedings.4' In addressing the
free-speech issue, the court refused to apply the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan42 standard of actual malice to disciplinary proceed-
ings sanctioning speech critical of judicial officials. 43 The court dis-
tinguished such proceedings from defamation actions, which are
subject to the New York Times standard, by focusing on the na-
ture of the relief sought.44 The court explained that defamation ac-
tions redress reputational injury, whereas disciplinary proceedings
safeguard professional conduct and preserve the orderly adminis-
36 Id. at 190-91, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The Lawyer's Code attempts to
resolve this impossibility with the following language:
[C]onduct that does not appear to violate the express terms of any Disciplinary
Rule nevertheless may be found by an enforcing agency to be the subject of disci-
pline on the basis of a general principle illustrated by a Disciplinary Rule or on
the basis of an accepted common law principle applicable to lawyers.
LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary Statement at 2.
Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
38 Id. at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
39 Id.
Id. at 191-92, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
Id. at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 33-34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43.
42 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'3 See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43. In support of
its rejection of petitioner's First Amendment claim, the court noted that neither it nor the
United States Supreme Court had ever applied the "constitutional malice" standard to dis-
ciplinary proceedings. Id.; see also infra note 51 (elaborating New York Times standard).
" See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
[Vol. 66:533
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tration of the judicial system.4 5 Thus, in Holtzman, the court held
that the New York Times actual malice standard is inapplicable
because it "would immunize all accusations, however reckless or
irresponsible, from censure as long as the attorney uttering them
did not actually entertain serious doubts as to their truth. 46
The Holtzman decision illustrated the first instance in which a
New York court employed DR 1-102(A)(6)[now (7)] to rebuke an
attorney for criticizing a judge outside of court proceedings.47
Id. (citations omitted).
See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 33-34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43. In adopt-
ing an objective standard, the court rejected the actual malice standard which focuses upon
the knowledge of the specific individual. Id. The Holtzman court reasoned that a subjective
standard would invalidate the Code by rendering any language non-censurable because of
the difficulty in proving knowledge. Id. The court recognized that unlike libel cases, discipli-
nary proceedings involve injury to society as a whole rather than to the judge as an individ-
ual and that a subjective standard would not work to preserve 'a fair, impartial judicial
system, and the system of justice as it has evolved for generations.' Id. (citation omitted).
'7 See Jay C. Carlisle, Panel Analyzes Sanctions, Admission Requirements, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 15, 1991, at S-30, ("Prior to the Holtzman decision there was no reported New York
case invoking DR [1-102(A)(7)] in this context.").
New York courts have disciplined attorneys for making false and unsupported accusa-
tions against judges since long before the adoption of the Code. See, e.g., In re Greenfield,
24 A.D.2d 651, 652, 262 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (2d Dep't 1965). In Greenfield, an attorney was
suspended for writing letters to a judge which falsely accused him of professional miscon-
duct. Id. at 651, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 349. In sustaining the charges of unprofessional conduct,
the court acknowledged that judges are not immune from criticism, but reasoned that such
false accusations can only impair the dignity of the court and administration of justice. Id.
at 652, 262-N.Y.S.2d at 350 (citations omitted); In re Bevans, 225 A.D. 427, 431, 233 N.Y.S.
439, 443 (3d Dep't 1929). In Bevans, an attorney was suspended for making unfounded ac-
cusations regarding judicial involvement in a conspiracy aimed at violating the law and
preventing proper prosecutions of crimes. See id. at 428, 233 N.Y.S. at 440. But see, e.g., In
re Murray, 11 N.Y.S. 336, 336 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1st Dep't 1890) (allegations of judicial
misconduct "should not be entertained . . . except upon the most impressive evidence").
Following New York's adoption of the Code, it appears there are only two reported
cases concerning attorney criticism of the judiciary outside a court proceeding. See In re
Baker, 34 A.D.2d 229, 233, 311 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74 (4th Dep't 1970), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 977, 272
N.E.2d 337, 323 N.Y.S.2d 837, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 915 (1971); Justices of the App. Div. v.
Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 559-60, 301 N.E.2d 426, 427, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441, 441 (1973). In
Baker, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a decision disciplining an attorney for sub-
mitting affidavits "containing unwarranted and irresponsible attacks upon the integrity of
both the law firm and the Surrogate of Monroe County." Baker, 28 N.Y.2d at 977, 272
N.E.2d at 337, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 837. In Erdmann, however, the court, without referring to
the Code, refused to.discipline an attorney for stating that judges were "whores who became
madams" because the statements were not censurable. Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d at 559-60, 301
N.E.2d at 427, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 442. Like the Holtzman court, the Erdmann court gave
scant direction to attorneys who wish to express criticism of the judiciary, stating that
"[p]erhaps persistent or general courses of conduct, even if parading as criticism, which are
degrading to the law, the Bar and the courts, and are irrelevant or grossly excessive, would
present a different issue." Id. at 559, 301 N.E.2d at 427. 347 N.Y.S.2d at 441. However, in In
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Rather than limiting the "catch-all" language of subsection
(6)[now (7)],48 the Holtzman court liberally construed the rule to
cover a wide spectrum of attorney conduct.49 It is submitted, how-
ever, that the court failed to articulate sufficient guidelines with
respect to what type of conduct would negatively reflect attorneys'
fitness to practice law pursuant to DR 1-102(A)(6)[now (7)]. As a
result, attorneys contemplating public disclosure of judicial mis-
conduct are left with little guidance to determine whether their ac-
tions will subject them to discipline.50
Furthermore, the court's broad interpretation of DR 1-
102(A)(6)[now (7)] not only proscribes constitutionally unpro-
tected speech, such as knowingly false or reckless statements, but
also prohibits some constitutionally protected speech, such as false
statements made in good faith.5 1 Consequently, the Holtzman de-
re Abbott, 167 A.D.2d 617, 618, 563 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (3d Dep't 1990), an attorney was
disciplined under DR 1-102(A)(6) [now (7)] and DR 8-102(B) for writing letters to judges
accusing them of professional misconduct. Id. at 618-19, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 849-50. The deci-
sion is distinguishable from Holtzman in that the Abbott court premised the discipline upon
the attorney's "making false and unsupported allegations in court proceedings." Id. The fact
that court proceedings are in progress has permitted encroachment of First Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2743-45 (1991) (attorney's
free speech right is "extremely circumscribed" during judicial proceeding).
The full extent of the degree to which attorneys have been disciplined by the various
grievance committees is unknown because all letters issued by a committee disciplining an
attorney are private and therefore confidential. See [1985] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 691.4(j) and
691.6(c); see also Hal R. Lieberman, Informal Discipline: Toll To Upgrade Ethics Part I;
Admonitions, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 22, 1991, at 1. According to the article, at least one attorney
was reproached for using insulting and derogatory language towards an opposing counsel.
Id.
48 See ABA/BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, § 101:602-610 (1987)
[hereinafter LAWYERS' MANUAL] (discussing broad application of DR 1-102(A)(6) [now (7)]).
49 See Carlisle, supra note 47, at S-30. The author explained, quoting the Holtzman
decision, that the court expanded subsection (6)[now (7)] by interpreting the "fitness" lan-
guage of subsection (6)[now (7)] to prohibit "'false allegation[s] of specific wrongdoing'"
against a judge that tends to diminish the public's confidence in the judiciary and disgrace
the profession. Id.
11 Id. at S-30. Carlisle further noted that the court's decision was so broad that it will
be impossible for an attorney to know in advance whether the rule will be invoked. Id.
5' See id.; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (imposing
higher standard of "constitutional malice" in defamation action brought against public offi-
cial). In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that those who publicly criticize public
officials within the scope of their official conduct will be afforded First Amendment protec-
tion if the statements were made with a good faith belief of truth. Id. at 279-80. No protec-
tion will be given, however, if the speech was made with actual or constitutional malice, that
is, that the publication was made with the knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard of
truth. Id. Courts have not clearly defined "reckless disregard." See St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968) ("reckless disregard" must be determined on case-by-case basis).
The Holtzman court followed a number of out-of-state decisions in refusing to label the
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
cision subjects attorneys to the risk of discipline by leaving uncer-
tain the extent to which practitioners must investigate the merits
of their charges prior to public dissemination.5 2 It is submitted
that this lack of guidance, coupled with New York's apparent
willingness to discipline attorneys-for criticizing judges, 3 will deter
lawyers from fulfilling their duty to reveal professional mis-
conduct. 4
New York practitioners should be aware that state courts will
not tolerate public criticism of members of the judiciary that turns
out to be false, regardless of the attorney's state of mind. The
court's decision to discipline Holtzman, in an effort to maintain
the integrity of the legal profession, was undoubtedly correct on
the facts of the case. However, there is a danger that the decision
will have a chilling effect on valid criticism of the judiciary by
disciplining of an attorney for criticizing a judge a First Amendment issue. See, e.g., In re
Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979) (professional misconduct action not protected by First
Amendment like law of defamation), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980); In re Disciplinary
Action Against Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn.) (same), cert. denied, Graham v.
Weruz, 111 S. Ct. 67 (1990); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)
(same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991). But see In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 497 (N.J.
1982) (stating that conduct in question is speech protected under First Amendment and
should rarely be limited). See generally Sandra M. Molley, Note, Restrictions on Attorney
Criticism of the Judiciary: A Denial of First Amendment Rights, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
489, 499-501 (1981) (discussing need to afford attorneys full First Amendment protection);
see also LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 48, § 101:602-610 (discussing historical treatment of
attorney criticism of judiciary).
2 See Carlisle, supra note 47, at S-30 (stating that "lawyer[s] who [are] certain of the
truth of [their] allegations, but who may be mistaken, tare] completely without any
guidelines").
11 See supra note 47 (cases discussing New York courts' historical willingness to impose
discipline upon attorneys for making false accusations against judges).
'4 See CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-103(B). Disciplinary Rule 1-103(B) provides: "A law-
yer possessing knowledge or evidence, not protected as a confidence or secret, concerning
another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence upon proper request
of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers
or judges." Id. In addition, EC 1-4 states that in order to maintain the integrity of the
profession, attorneys should voluntarily reveal violations of other lawyers to the proper offi-
cials. Id. EC 1-4. Furthermore, although EC 8-6 provides that attorneys have a right to
criticize judges publicly, it warns them to be sure of their claims and to avoid lessening the
public confidence in the profession. Id. EC 8-6; see also People v. Doe, 98 Misc. 2d 805, 809,
414 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621 (Nassau County Ct. 1979) (" 'When the propriety of professional con-
duct is questioned, any member of the Bar who is aware of the facts which give rise to the
issue is duty bound to present the matter to the proper forum .... ' (citation omitted)).
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:533
members of the bar. This would have the ironic result of impeding
the very objective the disciplinary rules seek to achieve.
Daniela V. Zenone
PENAL LAW
Penal Law section 245.00: New York Court of Appeals holds that
sexual activity in a parked vehicle is not a per se violation of the
public lewdness statute
The New York statute prohibiting public lewdness1 has histor-
ically been broadly construed.2 In determining whether a particular
I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.00 (McKinney 1989). The statute provides that "[a] person is
guilty of public lewdness when he intentionally exposes the private or intimate parts of his
body in a lewd manner or commits any other lewd act (a) in a public place, or (b) in private
premises under circumstances in which he may readily be observed from either a public
place or from other private premises, and with intent that he be so observed." Id.
Section 245.00 was part of an overall revision of the Penal Law based on recommenda-
tions by the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code,
which reorganized specific offenses and grouped like offenses together. The section replaced
§ 1140, which provided that "a person is guilty of public lewdness when, in a public place,
he intentionally exposes the private or intimate parts of his body in a lewd manner or com-
mits any other lewd act." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1140 (McKinney 1967). "[T]he statute was
amended. . . to make it clear that lewd conduct in a public place where it is reasonable to
assume the actor intends to be observed by the general public" as well as "lewd conduct in a
private place when the actor can and intends to be observed from a public place or other
private premises constituted the crime of public lewdness." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.00 com-
mentary at 296 (McKinney 1989).
Section 245.00 has been challenged numerous times as being unconstitutionally vague,
however, these challenges have been rejected. See People v. Darryl M., 123 Misc. 2d 723,
726-27, 475 N.Y.S.2d 704, 709 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (gravamen of § 245.00 is
"lewd public behavior" and not simply exposure of private or intimate parts of body); Peo-
ple v. Sullivan, 87 Misc. 2d 254, 254, 383 N.Y.S.2d 791, 792 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 9th Dep't and
10th Dep't 1976) (section 245.00 not void for vagueness). See generally Note, The Proposed
Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. RSv. 1469, 1539 (1964) (discussing sex offenses in
Penal Law).
2 See People v. Gilbert, 72 Misc. 2d 75, 76, 338 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Kings County 1972). To constitute a violation of the public lewdness statute, the defendant
must have committed the allegedly lewd acts in a "public place." See id. In determining
whether such conduct took place in public, New York courts have defined the term quite
liberally. One of the earliest cases involving public lewdness was People v. Bixby, 4 Hun 636
(1875). In Bixby, the court held that a room in a house of prostitution where women ex-
posed themselves in the presence of men was a "public place," despite the fact that the
doors, windows, and shutters of the house were closed. Id. The defendants were found guilty
of indecent exposure "in a public place." Id. Although later cases stated that the statute
should be narrowly and strictly construed, these cases held that § 1140 prohibited exposure
